We study a class of procurement auctions with a budget constraint, where an auctioneer is interested in buying resources or services from a set of agents. Ideally, the auctioneer would like to select a subset of the resources so as to maximize his valuation function, without exceeding a given budget. As the resources are owned by strategic agents however, our overall goal is to design mechanisms that are truthful, budget-feasible, and obtain a good approximation to the optimal value. Budgetfeasibility creates additional challenges, making several approaches inapplicable in this setting. Previous results on budget-feasible mechanisms have considered mostly monotone valuation functions. In this work, we mainly focus on symmetric submodular valuations, a prominent class of non-monotone submodular functions that includes cut functions. We begin first with a purely algorithmic result, obtaining a 2e e−1 -approximation for maximizing symmetric submodular functions under a budget constraint. We view this as a standalone result of independent interest, as it is the best known factor achieved by a deterministic algorithm. We then proceed to propose truthful, budget feasible mechanisms (both deterministic and randomized), paying particular attention on the Budgeted Max Cut problem. Our results significantly improve the known approximation ratios for these objectives, while establishing polynomial running time for cases where only exponential mechanisms were known. At the heart of our approach lies an appropriate combination of local search algorithms with results for monotone submodular valuations, applied to the derived local optima.
Introduction
We study a class of procurement auctions-also referred to as reverse auctions-with budget constraints. In a procurement auction, an auctioneer is interested in buying goods or services from a set of agents. In this setting, selecting an agent comes at a cost and there is a hard budget constraint that should not be violated. The goal of the auctioneer then is to select a budget-feasible subset of the agents so as to maximize his valuation function v(·), where v(S) denotes the value derived when S is the selected subset of agents to get services from.
The purely algorithmic version of the problem results in natural ''budgeted'' versions of known optimization problems. Since these problems are typically NP-hard, our focus is on approximation algorithms. Most importantly, in the setting considered here, the true cost of each agent is private information and we would like to design mechanisms that elicit truthful reporting by all agents. Hence, our ideal goal is to have truthful mechanisms that achieve a good approximation to the optimal value for the auctioneer, and are budget feasible, i.e., the sum of the payments to the agents does not exceed the prespecified budget. This framework of budget feasible mechanisms is motivated by recent application scenarios including crowdsourcing platforms, where agents can be viewed as workers providing tasks (e.g., [4, 16] ), and influence maximization in networks, where agents correspond to influential users (see e.g., [31, 3] , where the chosen objective is a coverage function).
Budget feasibility makes the problem more challenging, with respect to truthfulness, as it already rules out well known mechanisms such as VCG. We note that the algorithmic versions of such problems often admit constant factor approximation algorithms. However, it is not clear how to appropriately convert them into truthful budget feasible mechanisms. The question is nontrivial even if we allow exponential time algorithms, since computational power does not necessarily make the problem easier (see the discussion in [12] ). All these issues create an intriguing landscape, where one needs to strike a balance between the incentives of the agents and the budget constraints.
The first positive results on this topic were obtained by Singer [30] , for the case where v(·) is an additive or a non-decreasing submodular function. Follow-up works provided refinements and further results for richer classes of functions (see the related work section). Most of these works, however, make the assumption that the valuation function is non-decreasing, i.e., v(S) ≤ v(T ) for S ⊆ T , notable exceptions being the works of [12] and [6] . Although monotonicity makes sense in several scenarios, one can think of examples where it is violated. E.g., [12] studied the unweighted Budgeted Max Cut problem, as an eminent example of a non-monotone submodular objective function. Moreover, when studying models for influence maximization problems in social networks, adding more users to the selected set may some times bring negative influence [7] (some combinations of users may also not be compatible or well fitted together). Related to this, in the setting of [3] , an appealing class of objectives, under mild assumptions about the underlying network, correspond to weighted cut functions. To further motivate the study of non-monotone submodular objectives, consider the following well-studied sensor placement problem [8, 11, 22] : assume that we want to monitor some spatial phenomenon (e.g., the temperature of a specific environment), modeled as a Gaussian process. We may place sensing devices on some of the prespecified locations, but each location has an associated cost. A criterion for finding an optimal such placement, suggested by Caselton and Zidek [8] for the unit cost case, is to maximize the mutual information between chosen and non chosen locations, i.e., we search for the subset of locations that minimizes the uncertainty about the estimates in the remaining space. Such mutual information objectives are submodular but not monotone. In addition, it is straightforward to modify this problem to model participatory crowdsensing scenarios where users have incentives to lie about the true cost of installing a sensor. It becomes apparent that we would like to aim for truthful mechanisms with good performance for subclasses of non-monotone functions. At the moment, the few results known for arbitrary non-monotone submodular functions have very large approximation ratios and often superpolynomial running time. Even worse, in most cases, we do not even know of deterministic mechanisms (see Table 1 ). In trying to impose more structure so as to have better positive results, there is an interesting observation to make: the examples that have been mentioned so far, i.e., cut functions and mutual information functions are symmetric submodular, a prominent subclass of non-monotone submodular functions, where the value of a set S equals the value of its complement. This subclass has received already considerable attention in operations research, see e.g., [15, 28] , where more examples are also provided. We therefore find that symmetric submodular functions form a suitable starting point for the study of non-monotone functions.
Contribution:
The main focus of this work is on symmetric 1 submodular functions. As suggested in [28] , cut functions form a canonical example of this class. Consequently, we use the budgeted Max Cut problem throughout the paper as an illustrative example of how our more general approach could be refined for concrete objectives that have a well-behaved LP formulation. Our contributions can be summarized as follows:
• In Section 3 we obtain a purely algorithmic result, namely a 2e e−1 -approximation for symmetric submodular functions under a budget constraint. We believe this is of independent interest, as it is the best known factor achieved by a deterministic algorithm (there exists already a randomized e-approximation) assuming only a value oracle for the objective function.
• In Sections 4 and 5 we propose truthful, budget feasible mechanisms for arbitrary symmetric submodular functions, where previously known results regarded only randomized exponential mechanisms. We manage to significantly improve the known approximation ratios of such objectives by providing both randomized and deterministic mechanisms of exponential time. Moreover, we propose a general scheme for producing constant factor approximation mechanisms that run in polynomial time when the objective function is well-behaved. These results provide partial answers to some of the open questions discussed in [12] .
• In the same sections, aside from studying arbitrary symmetric submodular functions, we also pay particular attention on the weighted and unweighted versions of Budgeted Max Cut. For the weighted version we obtain the first deterministic polynomial time mechanism with a 27.25-approximation (where only an exponential randomized algorithm was known with a 768-approximation), while for the unweighted version we improve the approximation ratio for polynomial randomized mechanisms, from 564 down to 10, and for polynomial deterministic mechanisms, from 5158 down to 27.25.
• Finally, in Section 6 we briefly study the class of XOS functions, where we improve the current upper bound by a factor of 3.
All our contributions in mechanism design are summarized in Table 1 . We also stress that our mechanisms for general symmetric submodular functions use the value query model for oracle access to v, which is a much weaker requirement than the demand query model assumed in previous works, e.g., in [12] ..
Regarding the technical contribution of our work, the core idea of our approach is to exploit a combination of local search with mechanisms for non-decreasing submodular functions. The reason local search is convenient for symmetric submodular functions is that it produces two local optima, and we can then prove that the function v(·) is non-decreasing within each local optimum. This allows us to utilize mechanisms for non-decreasing submodular functions on the two subsets and then prove that one of the two solutions will attain a good approximation. The running time is still an issue under this approach, since finding an exact local optimum is not guaranteed to terminate fast. However, even by finding approximate local optima, within each of them the objective remains almost non-decreasing in a certain sense. This way we are still able to appropriately adjust our mechanisms and obtain provable approximation guarantees. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that this ''robustness under small deviations from monotonicity'' approach is used to exploit known results for monotone objectives. Table 1 : A summary of our results on mechanisms. The asterisk ( * ) indicates that the corresponding mechanism runs in superpolynomial time. The dagger ( †) indicates that previously known results do not directly apply here; see Remark 2.9 at the end of Section 2. The factor ρ is an upper bound on the ratio of the optimal fractional solution to the integral one, assuming that we can find the former in polynomial time. The factor 768 is due to [10] , while the factors 564 and 5158 are due to [12] .
Related Work: The study of budget feasible mechanisms, as considered here, was initiated by Singer [30] . Later, Chen et al. [10] significantly improved Singer's results, obtaining a randomized 7.91-approximation mechanism and a deterministic 8.34-approximation mechanism for non-decreasing submodular functions. Several modifications of the mechanism by [10] have been proposed that run in polynomial time for special cases [31, 19, 3] . For subadditive functions, Dobzinski et al. [12] suggested a randomized O(log 2 n)-approximation mechanism, and they gave the first constant factor mechanisms for non-monotone submodular objectives, specifically for cut functions. The factor for subadditive functions was later improved to O log n log log n by Bei et al. [6] , who also gave a randomized O(1)-approximation mechanism for XOS functions, albeit in exponential time, and further initiated the Bayesian analysis in this setting. An improved O(1)-approximation mechanism for XOS functions is also suggested in [25] . Recently, Amanatidis et al. [3] suggested a 4-approximation mechanism for a subclass of XOS functions that captures matroid and matching constraints. There is also a line of related work under the large market assumption (where no participant can significantly affect the market outcome), which allows for polynomial time mechanisms with improved performance [32, 4, 16, 5, 20] . On maximization of submodular functions subject to knapsack or other type of constraints, there is a vast literature, going back several decades, see, e.g., [27, 34] . More recently Lee et al. [24] provided the first constant factor randomized algorithm for submodular maximization under k matroid and k knapsack constraints, with factors k + 2 + 1 k and 5 respectively. The problem was also studied by Gupta et al. [18] who proposed a randomized algorithm, which achieves a (4 + α)-approximation 2 in case of knapsack constraints, where α is the approximation guarantee of the unconstrained submodular maximization. Later on Chekuri et al. [9] suggested a randomized 3.07-approximation algorithm improving the previously known results. Finally, Feldman et al. [14] and Kulik et al. [23] proposed their own randomized algorithms when there are knapsack constraints, achieving an e-approximation. 2 In the case of symmetric submodular functions the algorithm gives a deterministic 6-approximation. 3 The algorithm of [23] can be derandomized without any performance loss, but only assuming an additional
Notation and Preliminaries
We use A = [n] = {1, 2, ..., n} to denote a set of n agents. Each agent i is associated with a private cost c i , denoting the cost for participating in the solution. We consider a procurement auction setting, where the auctioneer is equipped with a valuation function v : 2 A → Q ≥0 and a budget B > 0. For S ⊆ A, v(S) is the value derived by the auctioneer if the set S is selected (for singletons, we will often write v(i) instead of v({i})). Therefore, the algorithmic goal in all the problems we study is to select a set S that maximizes v(S) subject to the constraint i∈S c i ≤ B. We assume oracle access to v via value queries, i.e., we assume the existence of a polynomial time value oracle that returns v(S) when given as input a set S.
We mostly focus on a natural subclass of submodular valuation functions that includes cut functions, namely non-negative symmetric submodular functions. Throughout this work we make the natural assumption that v(∅) = 0.
It is easy to see that v cannot be both symmetric and non-decreasing unless it is a constant function. In fact, if this is the case and v(∅) = 0, then v(S) = 0, for all S ⊆ A.
We also state an alternative definition of a submodular function, which will be useful later on.
Theorem 2.2 (Nemhauser et al. [27]). A set function v is submodular if and only if for all
We often need to argue about optimal solutions of sub-instances, from an instance we begin with. Given a cost vector c, and a subset X ⊆ A, we denote by c X the projection of c on X, and by c −X the projection of c on A X. We also let opt(X, v, c X , B) be the value of an optimal solution to the restriction of this instance on X, i.e., opt(X, v, c X , B) = max S: S⊆X, c(S)≤B v(S). Similarly, opt(X, v, c X , ∞) denotes the value of an optimal solution to the unconstrained version of the problem restricted on X. For the sake of readability, we usually drop the valuation function and the cost vector, and write opt(X, B) or opt(X, ∞).
Finally, in Sections 3-5 we make one further assumption: we assume that there is at most one item whose cost exceeds the budget. As shown in Lemma A.1 and Corollary A.2 in Appendix A.1, this is without loss of generality. Approximate local optima produce good approximations in unconstrained maximization of general submodular functions [13] . However, here they are of interest for a quite different reason that becomes apparent in Lemmata 3.1 and 4.1. We can efficiently find approximate local optima using the local search algorithm Approx-Local-Search of [13] . Note that this oracle for the extension by expectation, say V , of the objective function v. When only an oracle for v is available, estimation of V by sampling is required in general.
Local Optima and Local
is an algorithm for the unconstrained version of the problem, when there are no budget constraints.
Approx-Local-Search(A, v, ) [13] 1 S = {i * }, where i * ∈ arg max i∈A v(i) 2 while there exists some a such that max{v(S ∪ {a}), 
Mechanism Design
In the strategic version that we consider here, every agent i only has his true cost c i as private information. A mechanism M = (f, p) in our context consists of an outcome rule f and a payment rule p. Given a vector of cost declarations, b = (b i ) i∈A , where b i denotes the cost reported by agent i, the outcome rule of the mechanism selects the set f (b). At the same time, it computes payments p(b) = (p i (b)) i∈A where p i (b) denotes the payment issued to agent i. Hence, the final utility of agent i is p i (b) − c i .
The main properties we want to ensure for our mechanisms are the following. 
individually rational, if
For randomized mechanisms, we use the notion of universal truthfulness, which means that the mechanism is a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms.
We say that an outcome rule f is monotone, if for every agent i ∈ A, and any vector of cost declarations b, 
The payments in Lemma 2.5 are often referred to as threshold payments, since they indicate the threshold at which an agent stops being selected. Myerson's lemma simplifies the design of truthful mechanisms by focusing only on constructing monotone algorithms and not having to worry about the payment scheme. Nevertheless, in the setting we study here budget feasibility clearly complicates things further. For all the algorithms presented in the next sections, we always assume that the underlying payment scheme is given by Myerson's lemma.
Mechanisms for Non-Decreasing Submodular Valuations. In the mechanisms we design for non-monotone submodular functions, we will repeatedly make use of truthful budget feasible mechanisms for non-decreasing submodular functions as subroutines. The best known such mechanisms are due to Chen et al. [10] . Here, we follow the improved analysis of [20] for the approximation ratio of the randomized mechanism Rand-Mech-SM of [10] , stated below.
Rand-Mech-SM(A, v, c, B) [10] 1 Set A = {i | c i ≤ B} and i * ∈ arg max i∈A v(i) 2 with probability The mechanism Greedy-SM is a greedy algorithm that picks agents according to their ratio of marginal value over cost, given that this cost is not too large. For the sake of presentation, we assume the agents are sorted in descending order with respect to this ratio. The marginal value of each agent is calculated with respect to the previous agents in the ordering, i.e., 1 = arg max j∈A 
A derandomized version of Rand-Mech-SM is also provided by [10] . It has all the desired properties, while suffering a small loss on the approximation factor. Here, following the improved analysis of [20] for the ratio of Rand-Mech-SM, we fine-tune this derandomized mechanism to obtain Mech-SM that has a better approximation guarantee.
The next theorem summarizes the properties of Rand-Mech-SM and Mech-SM. Proof. Monotonicity (and thus truthfulness and individual rationality) and budget-feasibility of both mechanisms directly follow from [10] . What is left to show are the approximation guarantees.
The key fact here is the following lemma from [20] . Note that the lemma also follows from Lemma D.2 for = 0 and β = 0.5. For the rest of this proof, S will denote the outcome of Greedy-SM(A, v, c, B/2).
For Rand-Mech-SM, if X denotes the outcome of the mechanism, then directly by Lemma 2.8 we have E(v(X)) ≥ For Mech-SM we consider two cases:
If i * is returned by the mechanism, then (2+
Combining this with Lemma 2.8 we have opt(
opt(A, B) and
Remark 2.9. In [6] the proposed mechanisms regard XOS and non-decreasing subadditive objectives, but it is stated that their results can be extended for general subadditive functions as well. This is achieved by definingv(S) = max T ⊆S v(T ). It is easily seen thatv is non-decreasing, subadditive, and any solution that maximizes v is also an optimal solution forv. Although this is true for subadditive functions, it does not hold for submodular functions. In particular, if v is submodular, thenv is not necessarily submodular. Therefore the results of [10] cannot be extended to our setting, even when time complexity is not an issue. An example of howv may fail to be submodular when v is a cut function is given in Appendix A.2, where we also discuss how it can be derived from [17] that in such casesv is actually XOS. This also implies that the best previously known approximation factor for the class of symmetric submodular functions was indeed 768 (inherited by the use ofv).
The Core Idea: A Simple Algorithm for Symmetric Submodular Objectives
This section deals with the algorithmic version of the problem: given a symmetric submodular function v, the goal is to find S ⊆ A that maximizes v(S) subject to the constraint i∈S c i ≤ B. The main result is a deterministic 2e e−1 -approximation algorithm for symmetric submodular functions. For this section only, the costs and the budget are assumed to be integral.
Since our function is not monotone, we cannot directly apply the result of [33] , which gives an optimal simple greedy algorithm for non-decreasing submodular maximization subject to a knapsack constraint. Instead, our main idea is to combine appropriately the result of [33] with the local search used for unconstrained symmetric submodular maximization [13] . At a high level, what happens is that local search produces an approximate solution S for the unconstrained problem, and while this does not look related to our goal at first sight, v is ''close to being non-decreasing'' on both S and A S.
This becomes precise in Lemma 3.1 below, but the point is that running a modification of the greedy algorithm of [33] , on both S and A S will now produce at least one good enough solution.
LS-Greedy(A, v, c, B, ) 4 Let T be the best solution among T 1 and T 2 5 return T
The first component of our algorithm is the local search algorithm of [13] . By Lemma 2.3 and the fact that v is symmetric, both S and A S are 1 + 4n 2 -approximate local optima. We can now quantify the crucial observation that v is close to being non-decreasing within the approximate local optima S and A S. Actually, we only need this property on the local optimum that contains the best feasible solution. 
Then, for every T X and every
Before proving Lemma 3.1, we begin with a simple fact and a useful lemma. We note that Fact 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 below require only subadditivity. Submodularity is used later, within the proof of Lemma 3.1. 
Lemma 3.3. For any
If {i ∈ A | c i > B} = ∅, then by the fact that every singleton is a feasible solution we have
If {i ∈ A | c i > B} = {x} S * , then every singleton in A {x} is a feasible solution, and like before we have i∈S
Therefore, by using again that every singleton in A {x} is a feasible solution, we have i∈S
Proof of Lemma 3.1. By Fact 3.2 we have opt(X, B) ≥ 0.5 opt(A, B). Let T ⊆ X {i} for some i ∈ X. By submodularity we have v(
Since S is a 1 + 4n 2 -approximate local optimum and v is symmetric, X is also a 1 + 4n 2 -approximate local optimum. As a result, v(X {i}) ≤ 1 + 4n 2 v(X) and
where the second to last inequality follows from Lemma 3.3.
The second component of LS-Greedy is an appropriate modification of the greedy algorithm of [33] for non-monotone submodular functions. It first enumerates all solutions of size at most 3. Then, starting from each 3-set, it builds a greedy solution, and it outputs the best among these Θ(n 3 ) solutions. Here this idea is adjusted for non-monotone functions.
Greedy-Enum-SM (A, v, c, B) 1 Let S 1 be the best feasible solution of cardinality at most 3 (by enumerating all such solutions)
Find θ t = max
, and let i t be an element of A t−1 that attains θ t 7 if θ t ≥ 0 and i∈T ∪{it} c i ≤ B then
Let S be the best solution among S 1 and S 2 14 return S By Fact 3.2, at least one of S and A S contains a feasible solution of value at least 0.5 opt(A, B). Lemma 3.1 guarantees that in this set, v is very close to a non-decreasing submodular function. This is sufficient for Greedy-Enum-SM to perform almost as well as if v was non-decreasing. The proof is deferred to Appendix B. Theorem 3.4 suggests that a straightforward composition of two well known greedy algorithms achieves a good approximation for any symmetric submodular objective. We believe this is of independent interest and could be useful for other problems involving submodular optimization. From a mechanism design perspective, however, algorithm LS-Greedy fails to be monotone and thus it cannot be used directly in the subsequent sections. In the next two sections, we remedy the problem by removing the enumeration part of the algorithm.
A First Take on Mechanism Design
Utilizing the algorithmic approach of Section 3 to get truthful mechanisms is not straightforward. One of the reasons is that LS-Greedy is not monotone. We note that the algorithm Greedy-Enum-SM without the enumeration part is monotone even for general objectives, but, to further complicate things, it is not guaranteed to be budget-feasible or have a good performance anymore. Instead of computing approximate local optima like in Section 3, in this section we bypass most issues by computing exact local optima. The highlights of this simplified approach are polynomial mechanisms for unweighted cut functions with greatly improved guarantees.
The price we have to pay, however, is that in general, finding exact local optima is not guaranteed to run in polynomial time [29] . Still, these mechanisms deepen our understanding of the problem. As mentioned in the Introduction, the problem seems to remain hard even when the running time is not an issue, and many existing mechanisms for various classes of functions are not polynomial. In particular, there are no better known mechanisms-even running in exponential time-for symmetric submodular objectives. We are going to deal further with the issue of running time in Section 5.
Below we give a randomized mechanism that reduces the known factor of 768 down to 10, as well as the first deterministic O(1)-approximation mechanism for symmetric submodular objectives. In both mechanisms, local search produces a local maximum S for the unbudgeted problem and then the budgeted problem is solved optimally on both S and A S. As shown in Lemma 4.1, v is non-decreasing on both S and A S. Thus, running the mechanism Rand-Mech-SM or Mech-SM of [10] , as described in Section 2, on T ∈ arg max X∈{S,A S} opt(X, B), directly implies a good solution. Since the resulting randomized and deterministic mechanisms are very similar, we state them together for succinctness.
The next simple lemma is crucial for the performance of both mechanisms for arbitrary submodular functions, and it shows how local search helps us exploit known results for non-decreasing submodular functions. Its proof is similar in flavor to the proof of Lemma 3.1. Proof. The fact that v is submodular when restricted on 2 S is trivial. Suppose now that the statement is not true and that v is not non-decreasing on 2 S . That is, there exist
and therefore
We conclude that there is some ∈ [r] such that v(T ) − v(T {i }) < 0. Then, by submodularity and the fact that T {i } ⊆ S {i }, we get
But then v(S {i }) > v(S), which contradicts the fact that S is a local maximum of v. So, it must be the case that v is non-decreasing on the subsets of S.
Since v is symmetric, if S is a local optimum, so is A S. Lemma 4.1 suggests that we can use the mechanism Rand-Mech-SM (resp. Mech-SM) on S and A S, to get the following implications. Proof. The fact that both mechanism Rand-Mech-SymSM and Det-Mech-SymSM are budget-feasible follows from the budget-feasibility of Rand-Mech-SM and Mech-SM respectively, established in [10] . For truthfulness and individual rationality, it suffices to show that the allocation rule is monotone. Let us look first at Det-Mech-SymSM. Consider an agent i with true cost c i in an instance I where i is included in the winning set. Note first that the local search step is not affected by the costs, hence no player can influence the local optimum. Suppose now that it was the case that opt(S, B) ≥ opt(A S, B), hence i ∈ S. If player i now declares a lower cost, then the optimal solution within S can only get better, hence the mechanism will run Mech-SM on S as before. Since Mech-SM is monotone, player i will again be selected in the solution. We conclude that the outcome rule is monotone and
To prove that the randomized mechanism Rand-Mech-SymSM is universally truthful we use similar arguments. We fix the random bits of the mechanism and we consider a winning agent i like before. Again, no player can influence the outcome of local search. Suppose it is the case that opt(S, B) ≥ opt(A S, B), hence i ∈ S. If i declares a lower cost, then the optimal solution within S improves, and Rand-Mech-SM will still run on S. Since Rand-Mech-SM is universally truthful, it is monotone given the random bits, and player i will again be a winner. We conclude that Rand-Mech-SymSM is universally truthful.
To argue now about the approximation ratio, suppose that we are in the case that opt(S, B) ≥ opt(A S, B) (the other case being symmetric). We know by Fact 3.2 that opt(S, B) ≥ 0.5 · opt(A, B). Hence, since we run either Mech-SM or Rand-Mech-SM on S, we will get twice their approximation ratio. This implies a ratio of 10 for Rand-Mech-SymSM and a ratio of 6 + 2
Lower bounds on the approximability have been obtained by Chen et al. [10] for additive valuations. Since additive functions are not symmetric, these lower bounds do not directly apply here. However, it is not hard to construct symmetric submodular functions that give the exact same bounds. Lemma 4.3. Independent of complexity assumptions, there is no deterministic (resp. randomized) truthful, budget feasible mechanism that can achieve an approximation ratio
Proof. The lower bounds of [10] , v , c , B) . We conclude that any lower bound for Knapsack gives a lower bound for Budgeted Max Weighted Cut.
Clearly, both mechanisms presented in this section require superpolynomial time in general (due to their first two lines), unless P = N P . In both cases, instead of opt (·, B) we could use the optimal solution of a fractional relaxation of the problem, at the expense of somewhat worse guarantees. This does not completely resolve the problem, although this way local search becomes the sole bottleneck. For certain objectives, however, we can achieve similar guarantees in polynomial time. Unweighted cut functions are the most prominent such example, and it is the focus of the next subsection.
Polynomial Time Mechanisms for Unweighted Cut Functions
We begin with the definition of the problem when v is a cut function:
Budgeted Max Weighted Cut. Given a complete graph G with vertex set V (G) = [n], non-negative weights w ij on the edges, non-negative costs c i on the nodes, and a positive budget B, find X ⊆ [n] so that v(X) = i∈X j∈[n] X w ij is maximized subject to j∈X c j ≤ B.
For convenience, we assume the problem is defined on a complete graph as we can use zero weights to model any graph. In this subsection, we focus on the unweighted version, where all weights are equal to either 0 or 1. We call this special case Budgeted Max Cut. The weighted version is considered in Subsection 5.1.
The fact that local search takes polynomial time to find an exact local optimum for the unweighted version [21] does not suffice to make Rand-Mech-SymSM a polynomial time mechanism, since one still needs to compute opt(S, B) and opt(A S, B). However, a small modification so that Rand-Mech-SM(S, B) and Rand-Mech-SM(A S, B) are returned with probability 1/2 each (see Appendix D) yields a randomized 10-approximate polynomial time mechanism.
Rand-Mech-UCut (A, v, c, B) 1 S = Approx-Local-Search(A, v, 0) //find an exact local optimum 2 with probability 1/2 return Rand-Mech-SM(S, v, c S , B) 3 with probability 1/2 return Rand-Mech-SM(A S, v, c A S , B) Proof. Clearly, for the unweighted version of Max Cut, the mechanism runs in polynomial time. The fact that the mechanism is truthful, individually rational and budget feasible follows from the same arguments as in the proof of Theorem 4.2. 
v(i) .
Since we run mechanism Rand-Mech-SM with probability 1/2 on S and A S, it is not hard to see that each of X S and X A S is returned with probability 3/10, while each of i S and i A S is returned with probability 2/10. If X denotes the outcome of the mechanism, then using subadditivity and Lemma 2.8, we get
thus establishing an approximation ratio of 10.
In order to design deterministic mechanisms that run in polynomial time, we first optimize a deterministic mechanism of [3] to obtain Mech-SM-frac below, which is applicable for non-decreasing submodular functions. The difference with Mech-SM from Section 2, is that now we assume that a fractional relaxation of our problem can be solved optimally and that the fractional optimal solution is within a constant of the integral solution. To do this, we will consider a LP relaxation of an ILP formulation of the problem, and also bound the solution, using pipage rounding. In particular, let v(·) be a non-decreasing submodular function, A = {i ∈ A | c i ≤ B}, and consider a relaxation of our problem for which we have an exact algorithm. Moreover, suppose that
for any instance, where opt f and opt denote the value of an optimal solution to the relaxed and the original problem respectively.
Theorem 4.5 (inferred from [3] and Lemma D.2). Mech-SM-frac is deterministic, truthful,
individually rational, budget-feasible, and has approximation ratio ρ + 2 + ρ 2 + 4ρ + 1.
Also, it runs in polynomial time as long as the exact algorithm for the relaxed problem runs in polynomial time.

Mech-SM-frac(A, v, c, B)
1 Set A = {i | c i ≤ B} and i * ∈ arg max i∈A v(i) Note that when the relaxed problem is the same as the original (ρ = 1), then Mech-SMfrac becomes Mech-SM and the two approximation ratios coincide. A discussion on how different results combine into Theorem 4.5 is deferred to Appendix C.
Hence, to obtain a deterministic mechanism for Budgeted Max Cut, we will use an LP-based approach, and we will run Mech-SM-frac on an appropriate local maximum. For this, we will first need to compare the value of an optimal solution of a fractional relaxation to the value of an optimal solution of the original problem. Ageev and Sviridenko [1] studied a different Max Cut variant, but we follow a similar approach to obtain the desired bound for our problem as well. We begin with a linear program formulation of the problem. Our analysis is carried out for the weighted version of the problem, as we are going to reuse some results in Subsection 5.1, which deals with weighted cut functions. To be more precise, we want to argue about a variant of the problem where we may only be allowed to choose the solution from a specified subset of A. That is, we formulate below the sub-instance I = (X, v, c X , B) of (A, v, c, B) , where in fact X ⊆ A = {i ∈ A | c i ≤ B}.
We associate a binary variable x i for each vertex i, and the partition of A = [n] according to the value of the x i s defines the cut. There is also a binary variable z ij for each edge {i, j} which is the indicator variable of whether {i, j} is in the cut. maximize:
It is not hard to see that (1)- (7) is a natural ILP formulation for Budgeted Max Weighted
Cut and (1)- (6) is its linear relaxation. Let opt(I) and opt f (I) denote the optimal solutions to (1)- (7) and (1)- (6) respectively for instance I. To show how these two are related we will use the technique of pipage rounding [1, 2] . Although we do not provide a general description of the technique, the proof of the next theorem is self-contained (see Appendix C).
Theorem 4.6. Given the fractional relaxation (1)-(6) for Budgeted Max Weighted Cut,
we have that opt f (I) ≤ (2 + 2β I ) · opt(I), for any instance I, where β I is such that max i∈A v(i) ≤ β I · opt(I).
Note that there always exists some β I ≤ 1 for every instance I, hence, the above theorem implies a worst-case upper bound of 4. Now, we may modify Det-Mech-SymSM to use opt f instead of opt, and Mech-SM-frac instead of Mech-SM. This results in the following deterministic mechanism that runs in polynomial time.
Det-Mech-UCut(A, v, c, B) Proof. Clearly the mechanism runs in polynomial time.
For truthfulness and individual rationality, it suffices to show that the allocation rule is monotone, i.e., a winning agent j remains a winner if he decreases his cost to be c j < c j .
If j = i * and he wins in line 2, then his bid is irrelevant and he remains a winner. If j = i * , or j = i * but he wins after line 3, we may assume he wins at line 7 (the case of line 9 is symmetric). When bidding c j < c j , the decision of the mechanism in line 2 does not change (if j = i * then opt f is improved, if j = i * nothing changes). Further, since he cannot influence the local search, j is still in S and Mech-SM-frac is executed. By the monotonicity of Mech-SM-frac we have that j is still a winner. Therefore, the mechanism is monotone.
If the winner is i * in line 3, then his payment is B. Otherwise, budget-feasibility follows from the budget-feasibility of Mech-SM-frac and the observation that the comparison in line 2 only gives additional upper bounds on the payments of winners from Mech-SM-frac.
It remains to prove the approximation ratio. We consider two cases. Let α = 26.25. If i * is returned in line 3, then
and therefore opt(A, B)
On the other hand, if X = Mech-SM-frac(S, B) is returned in line 7, then by Theorem 4.6 with factor 4 we have
Therefore, v(i * ) < 
(X).
The case where X = Mech-SM-frac(A S, B) is returned in line 9 is symmetric to the case above and it need not be considered separately. We conclude that opt(A, B) ≤ 27.25 · Det-Mech-UCut(A, B).
Symmetric Submodular Objectives Revisited
Suppose that for a symmetric submodular function v, an optimal fractional solution can be found efficiently and that opt f (A , B) ≤ ρ · opt(A, B) for any instance, where opt f and opt denote the value of an optimal solution to the relaxed and the original problem respectively, and A = {i ∈ A | c i ≤ B}.
A natural question is whether the approach taken for unweighted cut functions can be fruitful for other symmetric submodular objectives. In the mechanisms of Subsection 4.1, however, the complexity of local search can be a bottleneck even for objectives where an optimal fractional solution can be found fast and it is not far from the optimal integral solution. So, we now return to the idea of Section 3, where local search runs in polynomial time and produces an approximate local maximum; unfortunately, the nice property of monotonicity in each side of the partition (Lemma 4.1) does not hold any longer. This means that the approximation guarantees of such mechanisms do not follow in any direct way from existing work. Moreover, budget-feasibility turns out to be an even more delicate issue since it crucially depends on the (approximate) monotonicity of the valuation function. Specifically, when a set X only contains a very poor solution to the original problem, every existing proof of budget feasibility for the restriction of v on X completely breaks down. Since we cannot expect that an approximate local maximum S and its complement A S both contain a ''good enough'' solution to the original problem, we need to make sure that Greedy-SM never runs on the wrong set.
The mechanism Det-Mech-UCut for the unweighted cut problem seems to take care of this and we are going to build on it, in order to propose mechanisms for arbitrary symmetric submodular functions. To do so we replace the constant 26.25 that appears in Det-Mech-UCut by α = (1 + ρ) 2 + ρ + ρ 2 + 4ρ + 1 − 1 and we find an approximate local maximum instead of an exact local maximum. Most importantly, in order to achieve budget-feasibility we introduce a modification of Mech-SM-frac (which we call Mech-SMfrac-var, see Appendix D.2) that runs Greedy-SM with a slightly reduced budget. The parameter that appears in the description of the mechanism below is determined by the analysis of the mechanism and only depends on the constants ρ and . Theorem 5.1 below shows that for any objective for which we can establish a constant upper bound ρ on the ratio of the fractional and the integral optimal solutions, we have constant factor approximation mechanisms that run in polynomial-time . Appendix D is mostly dedicated to the proof of the theorem. We view Theorem 5.1 as the most technically demanding result of this work. There are several steps involved in the proof, since we need the good properties of Greedy-SM to still hold even for objectives that are not exactly non-decreasing.
Weighted Cut Functions
Let us return now to the Max Cut problem, and consider the weighted version. An immediate implication of Theorem 5.1 is that we get a deterministic polynomial-time mechanism for Budgeted Max Weighted Cut with approximation ratio 58.72. This is just the result of substituting ρ = 4, as suggested by Theorem 4.6, in the formula for α.
Corollary 5.2. There is a deterministic, truthful, individually rational, budget-feasible mechanism for Budgeted Max Weighted Cut that has approximation ratio 58.72 and runs in polynomial time.
However, Theorem 4.6 says something stronger: given that max i∈A v(i) is small compared to opt(A, B), ρ is strictly smaller than 4. Note that the first step in Det-MechSymSM-frac is to compare max i∈A v(i) to opt f (A {i * }, B). This implies an upper bound on max i∈A v(i) in the following steps and we can use it to further fine-tune our mechanism. In particular, by setting α = 26.245 instead of (1 + 4) 2 + 4 + √ 16 + 16 + 1 − 1 = 57.72
in Det-Mech-SymSM-frac, we prove in Appendix D.2 the following improved result that matches the approximation guarantee for unweighted cut functions. 
An Improved Upper Bound for XOS Objectives
In [6] a randomized, universally truthful and budget-feasible 768-approximation mechanism was introduced for XOS functions. For several of the results in Sections 4 and 5 the best previously known upper bound follows from this result (see also Remark 2.9). In this section we slightly modify their mechanism to improve its performance. 4 Although there is not much novelty in this result, it feels appropriate to provide this tighter analysis, given that the factor of 768 has been the benchmark against which our results are presented. We begin with the definition of XOS functions. Note that above we define non-decreasing XOS functions, and everything is stated and proved for those. However, there is a relatively straightforward way to extend any result to general XOS functions (as defined in [17] ); see Remark 2.9 and Appendix A.2.
Below we provide the mechanism Main-XOS. Our mechanism has the same structure as the one presented in [6] but we tune its parameters and perform a slightly different analysis in order to improve the approximation factor. The mechanism Additive-Mechanism of [10] for additive valuation functions is used as a subroutine. Additive-Mechanism is a universally truthful, 3-approximate mechanism (see Theorem B.2 in [10] ). Initially, we revisit the random sampling part of the mechanism and modify the threshold bound of line 2:
Sample-XOS 1 Pick each item independently at random with probability This part is used as one of the two alternatives of the main mechanism. We modify the probabilities with which the two outcomes occur:
Main-XOS
1 With probability p = 0.08, pick a most valuable item as the only winner and pay him B 2 With probability 1 − p, run Sample-XOS By following a similar but more careful analysis, we improve the approximation ratio by a factor of 3 while also retaining its properties. Notice that like the mechanism of [6] , Main-XOS is randomized and has superpolynomial running time. In particular, it requires a demand oracle.
Theorem 6.2. Main-XOS is universally truthful, individually rational, budget-feasible, and
has approximation ratio 244.
Proof. Universal truthfulness, individual rationality and budget feasibility follow directly from the proof of Theorem 3.1 of [6] . We next prove the approximation ratio of the mechanism. Let i * ∈ arg max i∈A v(i) and X S be the output of Sample-XOS. In addition, let X be an optimal solution, i.e., a subset of A such that v(X) = opt(A, v, c, B) and c(X) ≤ B. We need the following two lemmata: 
(S).
Let κ = 74. We are going to use κ to set different values for k in Lemma 6.4 for different cases. We follow a similar analysis as [6] , but since we use two different values for k, things get a little more complicated. Let X M to be the output of Main-XOS. We have the following three case regarding the value of item i * : (A, v, c, B) . In this case we have that
,
. Note that now we can apply Lemma 6.4 with k = κ 3.8 . We split this case into two subcases:
• c(S * ) > B. Since c(S * ) is more than B we can find a subset S ⊆ S * , such that 
By using Lemma 6.4 we have
Since opt(S * , α, c S * , B) is the value of an optimal solution and S a particular solution under budget constraint B, we conclude that
, with probability at least 1 2 .
• c(S * ) ≤ B. In this case we have that
Let S = X T . We have c(S ) ≤ c(X) ≤ B and also, by using Lemma 6.4, v(S ) ≥ κ−3.8 4κ opt(A, v, c, B) with probability of at least 1 2 . Then, we have
, with probability at least . Now recall that Additive-Mechanism has an approximation factor of at most 3 with respect to opt(S * , α, c S * , B). So we can finally derive that
Thus the solution that Main-XOS returns has expected value
By substituting the values for p, κ we get , c, B) . The analysis of case 2 holds here as well, so we omit the details. The only difference is that now Lemma 6.4 should be applied with k = κ. 
By substituting the values for p, κ we get opt(A, v, c, B) ≤ 243.3 · E(v(X M )).
We conclude that opt(A, v, c, B) ≤ 244 · E(v(X M )).
Conclusions
In this work, we have made progress on the design of budget-feasible mechanisms for symmetric submodular objectives. The highlights of our results are polynomial time algorithms for the Budgeted Max Cut problem (weighted and unweighted) with significant improvements over previously known approximation factors. Although for general symmetric submodular functions we have exponential running times, the results imply polynomial time algorithms for any objective, where we can bound the optimal fractional solution with respect to the integral one. These results make further progress on the questions posed by [12] . It remains an open problem however, whether any of these approximation ratios are tight. Regarding our techniques, we expect that the idea of utilizing local search in order to identify monotone regions of a general submodular function may have further applications on mechanism design. Finally, apart from the mechanism design problem, the algorithmic result of Section 3 is an interesting consequence for submodular optimization.
A Missing Material from Section 2 A.1 Instances with Costs Exceeding the Budget
Consider an instance with a symmetric submodular function, where there exist agents with c i > B. It may seem at first sight that we could just discard such agents, since too expensive agents are not included in any feasible solution anyway. However, the presence of such agents can create infeasible solutions of very high value and make an analog of Lemma 3.1 impossible to prove. Simply discarding them could also destroy the symmetry of the function (e.g., if we had a cut function defined on a graph, we could not just remove a node).
Let I denote the set of all instances of the problem with symmetric submodular functions, and let J denote the set of all instances where at most one agent has cost more than B. Given X ⊆ A, we let c(X) = i∈X c i . The next lemma, together with its corollary, show that, when dealing with symmetric submodular functions, we may only consider instances in J without any loss of generality. • If X is a feasible solution of I, then v(X) = v (X) and c(X) = c (X). In particular, opt(J ) = opt(I).
Proof. Let E = {i ∈ A | c i > B} be the set of expensive agents and define A = (A E)∪{i E }, where i E is a new agent replacing the whole set E. For i ∈ A E we define c i = c i , while c i E = B + 1. Finally, v is defined as follows
Now suppose X is a budget-feasible solution of I. Then c(X) ≤ B and thus X ⊆ A E. But then, by the definition of c , c (X) = c(X) ≤ B as well, and therefore X is also a budget-feasible solution of J. Moreover, v (X) = v(X) by the definition of v . We conclude that opt(I) ≤ opt(J ).
The proof that every feasible solution of J is a feasible solution of I is almost identical. This implies opt(J ) ≤ opt(I), and therefore opt(J ) = opt(I). Now, it is not hard to see that we can turn any algorithmic result on J to the same algorithmic result on I. However, we need a somewhat stronger statement to take care of issues like truthfulness and budget-feasibility. This is summarized in the following corollary. Proof. The description of alg is quite straightforward. Given an instance I = (A, v, c, B) ∈ I, alg first constructs instance J = (A , v , c , B) ∈ J , as described in the proof of Lemma A.1. Then alg runs alg with input J and returns its output. Clearly, if alg runs in polynomial time, so does alg.
If X = alg (J) = alg(I), then X is feasible with respect to J and opt(J ) ≤ ρ · v (X). By Lemma A.1 we get that X is feasible with respect to I and opt(I) = opt(J ) ≤ ρ·v (X) = ρ · v(X). This establishes the approximation ratio of alg.
Next, assume that alg is monotone and-assuming Myerson's threshold paymentsbudget-feasible on instances in J . Suppose that agent j ∈ alg(I) reduces his cost from c j to b j < c j . This results in a new instance I * = (A, v, (b j , c −j ) , B) ∈ I. Since it must be the case where c j ≤ B, the corresponding instance of J is J * = (A , v , (b j , c −j ), B) . Due to the monotonicity of alg we have j ∈ alg(I) = alg (J) ⇒ j ∈ alg (J * ) = alg(I * ) , and therefore alg is monotone as well.
The budget-feasibility of alg follows from the budget-feasibility of alg by observing
A.2 Regarding Remark 2.9
We use the cut function on a very simple graph and show that although v is submodular, v is not. Consider the following graph where each edge has unit weight:
We compute the value of the following sets:
Now it is easy to see that although {a} ⊆ {a, c} we havev({a} ∪ {b}) −v({a}) = 0 < 1 = v({a, c} ∪ {b}) −v({a, c}).
So an interesting question is ifv can be classified when v is submodular. In [17] the general XOS class was introduced, where it is allowed for a function to be non-monotone (recall here that the XOS class contains only non-decreasing functions by definition). They proved that when v is general XOS thenv is XOS, while in addition they observed that the class of non-negative submodular functions is a strict subset of the general XOS class.
Thus since any non-negative submodular function v is also general XOS we concludev is XOS.
B Proof of Theorem 3.4
To facilitate the exposition of the analysis, we restate algorithm Greedy-Enum-SM, so that instead of the set variable T , we have a variable S t that describes the set constructed at iteration t. 
15 return S ∈ arg max
Recall that Var-Greedy-Enum-SM runs on both S and A S and LS-Greedy returns the best solution of these two. We may assume, without loss of generality that opt(S, B) = max{opt(S, B), opt(A S, B)} (the case for A S being symmetric). By Fact 3.2 we have opt(S, B) ≥ 0.5 opt (A, B) . So, it suffices to show that running Var-Greedy-Enum-SM on S outputs a set of value at least (1 − 1/e − ) opt (S, B) .
In what follows we analyze the approximation ratio achieved by Var-Greedy-Enum-SM(S, v, c, B) with respect to opt(S, B). For this, we follow closely the proof of the main result in [33] .
If there is an optimal solution for our problem restricted on S, of cardinality one, two or three, then the set S 1 of Var-Greedy-Enum-SM will be such a solution. Hence, assume that the cardinality of any optimal solution is at least four and let S * be such a solution. If necessary, reorder the elements of S * = {j 1 , . . . , j |S * | } so that j 1 = arg max v({j }),
Let Y = {j 1 , j 2 , j 3 }. For notational convenience, we will use the function g(·) = v(·) − v(Y ). It is straightforward that g(·) is submodular. Moreover, the following fact follows from [33] .
Consider the execution of the greedy algorithm with initial set U = Y . Let t * + 1 be the first time when an element i t * +1 ∈ S * is not added to S t * . In fact, we assume that t * + 1 is the first time when S t = S t−1 . (To see that this is without loss of generality, if there is some time τ < t * + 1 such that i τ is not added to S τ −1 , then-by the definition of t * + 1-it must be the case that i τ / ∈ S * . But then, we may consider the instance (S {i τ }, v, c S {iτ } , B) instead. We have v(S * ) = opt(S {i τ }, B) = opt(S, B) and the greedy solution constructed in the iteration where S 0 = Y is exactly the same as before.)
We are going to distinguish two cases.
As noted in [33] , since the ρ i s are nonnegative we have
So, as a direct application of Theorem B.2 we have
Finally, using the above inequality and Fact B.1, we get
Since in both cases the final output T * of the algorithm has value at least v(S t * ), this implies that
thus concluding the analysis of the performance of the algorithm.
C Missing Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Theorem 4.5. Monotonicity (and therefore truthfulness and individual rationality) and budget-feasibility of the mechanism directly follow from [10] and [3] . Next we show the approximation guarantee. As with the proof of Theorem 2.7, Lemma 2.8 is crucial.
Let S denote the outcome of Greedy-SM(A, v, c, B/2). We also consider two cases. Let α = ρ + 1 + ρ 2 + 4ρ + 1.
• On the other hand, if S is returned, 
subject to:
So, if x is any feasible integral vector to our problem, we have F (x) ≤ opt(I). Moreover, given any feasible solution x, z to (1)-(6), the value of (1) is upper bounded by L(
Next, we show that F (x) ≥ 0.5L(x). This follows from the inequality
proven by Ageev and Sviridenko [1] . For completeness we prove it here as well. Notice that by replacing a and b by 1 − a and 1 − b respectively both sides of the inequality remain exactly the same. Therefore, it suffices to prove 2(
Hence, if x * , z * is an optimal fractional solution to (1)- (6), then the value of (1) is opt f (I) = L(x * ) and thus F (x * ) ≥ 0.5L(x * ) = 0.5 opt f (I). However, x * may have several fractional coordinates. Our next step is to transform x * to a vector x that has at most one fractional coordinate and at the same time F (x ) ≥ F (x * ). To this end, we show how to reduce the fractional coordinates by (at least) one in any feasible vector with at least two such coordinates.
Consider a feasible vector x, and suppose x i and x j are two non integral coordinates. Note that i, j ∈ X. Let x i,j be the vector we get if we replace x i by x i + and x j by x j − c i /c j and leave every other coordinate of x the same. Note that the functionF ( ) = F (x i,j ), with respect to , is either linear or a polynomial of degree 2 with positive leading coefficient.
That is,F ( ) is convex. Notice now that x i,j always satisfies the budget constraint (9) , and also satisfies (11) as long as
Due to convexity,F ( ) attains a maximum on one of the endpoints of this interval, say at * . Moreover, at either endpoint at least one of x i + * and x j − * c i /c j is integral. That is, x i,j * has at least one more integral coordinate than x and F (x i,j * ) ≥ F (x). So, initially x ← x * . As long as there exist two non integral coordinates x i and x j we set x ← x i,j * as described above. This happens at most n − 1 times, and outputs a feasible vector x with at most one non-integral coordinate, and with F (x ) ≥ F (x * ). We have then the following implications:
If x is integral, then by (12) we have opt f (I) ≤ 2 · F (x ) ≤ 2 · opt(I), and we are done. So, suppose that x r is the only fractional coordinate of x . Let x 0 and x 1 be the vectors we get if we set x r to 0 or 1 respectively and leave every other coordinate of x the same. Notice that for a, b ∈ [0, 1] the inequality (1 − a)(b − 1) ≤ 0 implies a + b − ab ≤ 1 and therefore a + b − 2ab ≤ 1, so we have
and thus
Combining (12)and (13), we have
Using the fact that F is upper bounded by opt(I) on integral vectors, we have that F (x 0 ) ≤ opt(I). Observe now also that F (x 1 − x 0 ) = j∈[n] r w rj = v(r) ≤ β I opt(I), by the definition of β I . Hence, overall we get opt f (I) ≤ (2 + 2β I ) opt(I) , thus completing the proof.
D Missing Material from Section 5 D.1 Going Beyond Non-Decreasing Objectives
Here we pave the way for the main results of Section 5, and therefore we need to prove that certain mechanisms work even for objectives that are not exactly non-decreasing. To make this precise, given a ground set A, a budget B and a constant ≥ 0, we say that a set function v is (B, )-quasi-monotone (or just quasi-monotone) on a set X ⊆ A if for every T X and every i ∈ X T , we have v(T ∪ {i}) − v(T ) ≥ − n opt(X, B). Clearly, (B, 0)-quasi-monotone on X just means non-decreasing on X.
The main lemmas needed for our proofs are about Greedy-SM, as it all boils down to the monotonicity, budget-feasibility, and approximation ratio of this simple mechanism. As mentioned in Lemma 2.6, Greedy-SM is monotone, since any item out of the winning set remains out of the winning set if it increases its cost. , and then budget feasibility directly follows from and is still included in the output S of Greedy-SM(A, v, (c −j , b j ), (1 − U )B/2). Let b = (c −j , b j ) and notice that up to agent j − 1, agents are added to S in the same order as they do in S, but after that the ordering If S S j = ∅ then we directly get v(S j ) ≥ (1 − U )v(S), otherwise we have
where the last inequality follows from the choice of b j , while the next to last inequality follows from submodularity as [j − 1] = S j−1 ⊆ S j−1 . Therefore, v(S j ) ≥ (1/2 − U + U/2)v(S). The proof follows the proof of Theorem 4.7. In fact, the monotonicity-and thus truthfulness and individual rationality-of the mechanism follows from that proof and the observation that Mech-SM-frac-var is monotone even when v is non-monotone. The latter is due to the monotonicity of Greedy-SM which is straightforward and is briefly discussed in Appendix D.1.
We proceed with the approximation ratio. If i * is returned in line 3, then α · v(i * = ρ+1 . The case where X is returned in line 9 is symmetric. We conclude that in any case opt(A, B) ≤ (α + 1 + ) · Det-Mech-SymSM-frac(A, B).
